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Controversy has arisen again over the federal government's
electronic surveillance efforts to gather intelligence on foreign
terrorist groups. Recent disclosures, both authorized and illicit, have
described two secret National Security Agency (NSA) programs. The
first collects telephone "metadata" such as calling records-but not the
content of phone calls-both inside and outside the United States. A
second NSA program intercepts the e-mails of non-U.S. persons
outside the United States.1 Despite the claims of critics, these
programs do not violate the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA), as recently amended by Congress, or the Fourth Amendment
to the Constitution. Concerns about the proper balance between these
surveillance programs and individual privacy may be appropriate, but
they properly fall within the province of Congress and the President to
set future national security policy.
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Oversight and Partnerships (Aug. 9, 2013), available at
http://www.nsa.gov/public-info/files/speeches testimonies/201308_og the nsa sto
ry.pdf; Barack Obama, President of the United States of America, President Obama Holds a
Press Conference (Aug. 9, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-
video/video/2o13/o8/o9/president-obama-holds-press-conference. An up-to-date
catalogue of the declassified documents can be found at: Shawn Turner, DNIDeclassifies
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Legal questions over surveillance arise from the unconventional
nature of the war against al Qaeda. On September 11, 2001, the al
Qaeda terrorist network launched attacks on New York City and
Washington, D.C. from territory in Afghanistan substantially under its
control. Under normal circumstances, American military and
intelligence officers, acting pursuant to the President's Commander-
in-Chief authority, would carry out electronic surveillance against a
foreign enemy in wartime. Al Qaeda, however, operates through teams
of covert agents who disguise their communications and movements
within normal peaceful activities. American law subjects domestic
criminal enterprises, which operate in similar ways, to the more
elaborate system of search warrants, individualized suspicion, and
judicial supervision required by the Fourth Amendment. Controversy
over the legality of the NSA's programs basically centers on whether
surveillance of al Qaeda should follow the wartime/foreign
intelligence model or the criminal justice approach.
This paper will address the legality of the NSA's programs in this
light. Part I will describe the surveillance efforts against al Qaeda
within a broader historical and legal context. Part II will argue that the
programs, as described publicly by authoritative sources, appear to
meet statutory requirements. Part III will address whether the NSA
programs are constitutional along two dimensions. First, it will argue
that even if some aspect of the NSA programs does not fall within
Congress's authorization for foreign intelligence and counter-
terrorism surveillance, it would most likely rest within the President's
Commander-in-Chief authority over the management of war. Second,
even if the federal government has the internal authority to conduct
surveillance, the Bill of Rights, through the Fourth Amendment, may
still prohibit its application to citizens or non-citizens present in the
territorial United States. Part III will argue, however, that the NSA
programs do not violate the Fourth Amendment, as currently
interpreted by the federal courts.
I.
On September 11, 2001, the al Qaeda network launched four
coordinated attacks aimed at critical buildings in the heart of the
nation's capital and financial system. Nineteen terrorists hijacked four
civilian passenger airliners and crashed them into the World Trade
Center towers in New York City and the Pentagon outside
Washington, D.C. Another flight, apparently destined for Congress or
the White House, fell in Pennsylvania after passengers fought to seize
back control of the plane. The attacks killed about 3,000 people, with
many more injured, caused billions of dollars in physical damage, and
caused further economic loss due to disruptions in transportation,
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communications, and the financial markets. If a nation-state, such as
the Soviet Union during the Cold War, had carried out the identical
strikes, there would be little doubt that the United States would be at
war.
These attacks, however, significantly differed from a normal attack
in a conventional war. The enemy's soldiers did not wear uniforms,
did not carry arms openly, and did not operate as part of regular
military units. Mohammed Atta and his eighteen agents disguised
themselves as civilians for travel and training, used civilian aircrafts as
weapons, and launched the attacks by surprise from within U.S.
borders. Al Qaeda itself cannot lay claim to the status of a nation. In
2001, it exercised no territorial sovereignty, it had no population, and
fielded no regular armed forces. Rather, al Qaeda takes the form of a
decentralized network of extremists who wish to engineer
fundamentalist political and social change in Islamic countries. Its
terrorist cells operate both abroad and within the United States.
It is al Qaeda's nature as a decentralized network that pressures
the normal division between military and intelligence surveillance and
the warrant-based approach of the criminal justice system. The
Constitution vests the President with the executive power and
designates him Commander-in-Chief.2 The Framers understood these
powers to place the duty on the executive to protect the nation from
foreign attack and the right to control the conduct of military
hostilities.3 To exercise that power effectively, the President must have
the ability to engage in electronic surveillance that gathers intelligence
on the enemy. Regular military intelligence need not follow standards
of probable cause for a warrant or reasonableness for a search, just as
the use of force against the enemy does not have to comply with the
Fourth Amendment. During war, military signals intelligence might
throw out a broad net to capture all communications within a certain
area or by an enemy nation. Unlike the criminal justice system, which
seeks to detain criminals, protection of national security need not rest
on particularized suspicion of a specific individual.
This approach applies to national security activity that occurs
within the United States as well as outside it. In 1972, the Supreme
2 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
3 See, THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 471-72 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1961)
("Energy in the executive ... is essential to the protection of the community against foreign
attacks"); THE FEDERALIST NO. 74, at 500 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)
("Of all the cares or concerns of government, the direction of war most peculiarly demands
those qualities which distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand"). See also JOHN
YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER
9/11 143-81 (2005).
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Court refused to subject surveillance for national security purposes to
the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.4 It has extended these
protections to purely domestic terrorist groups, out of concern that
the government might use its powers to suppress political liberties.
Lower courts, however, have found that when the government
conducts a search of a foreign power or its agents, it need not meet the
requirements that apply to criminal law enforcement. In a leading
1980 case, the Fourth Circuit held that "the needs of the executive are
so compelling in the area of foreign intelligence, unlike the area of
domestic security, that a uniform warrant requirement would unduly
frustrate the President in carrying out his foreign affairs
responsibilities."5 A warrant for national security searches would
reduce the flexibility of the executive branch, which possesses
"unparalleled expertise to make the decision whether to conduct
foreign intelligence surveillance" and is "constitutionally designated as
the pre-eminent authority in foreign affairs."6 A warrant requirement
would place the national security decisions in the hands of the
judiciary, which "is largely inexperienced in making the delicate and
complex decisions that lie behind foreign intelligence surveillance. "7
Under this framework, Presidents had conducted national security
surveillance under their executive authority for decades. President
Nixon's abuses, however, led Congress to enact the FISA in 1978.s
FISA replaced presidentially-ordered monitoring of national security
threats with a system similar to that used by law enforcement to
conduct electronic surveillance of criminal suspects, but with
important differences to protect classified information. FISA requires
the government to show "probable cause" that a target is "an agent of
a foreign power," which includes terrorist groups.9 A special court of
federal district judges, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
(FISC) examines classified information in a closed, ex parte hearing,
before issuing the warrant. 10
4 United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 322 (1972).
5 United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 9o8, 913 (4th Cir. 198o).
6 Id. at 913-14.
7Id.
8 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified
at 50 U.S.C. § 18oi et seq. (2010)).
9 50 U.S.C. § 18o5(a)(2).
10 50 U.S.C. § 1803.
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FISA obviously strikes a compromise between the wartime and
criminal approaches to information gathering. It establishes a system
that bears strong resemblances to the criminal justice system, such as
the requirement of an individual target, probable cause, and a warrant
issued by a federal court. On the other hand, in a nod to the purposes
of foreign intelligence surveillance, it does not require a showing of
probable cause of criminal activity by the target, which the Fourth
Amendment normally requires for a search warrant.11 Instead, FISA
only demands that the government show "probable cause" that the
target is linked to a foreign power or terrorist group.
The Patriot Act of 2001 made important changes to FISA, which
bear directly on the legality of the NSA surveillance programs. Section
215 of the Patriot Act allows the government to seek an order from the
FISC to a private party for "tangible things," which includes "books,
records, papers, documents, and other items."12 The government can
obtain the records for two purposes: either for "an investigation to
obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States
person" or "to protect against international terrorism or clandestine
intelligence activities," so long as it does not infringe on First
Amendment-protected activity.3 To obtain the order, the government
must show that "there are reasonable grounds to believe" that the
records are "relevant" to "an authorized investigation. '"14 An
investigation is presumptively authorized if the records are related to
"the activities of a suspected agent of a foreign power" or someone in
contact with such an agent.15
Section 215 does not contain a revolutionary grant of authority to
the government. It is akin to a grand jury subpoena for financial,
communication, or travel records as part of a criminal investigation.
In fact, the statute additionally defines the records as those that can be
obtained by a subpoena issued by a federal court as part of a grand
jury investigation.16 Section 215 of the Patriot Act provides the
authority for the NSA's collection of telephone billing records. The
NSA collects the data containing the phone numbers on both ends of a
11 See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
12 USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2001)).
13 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(1).
14 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A).
15 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A)(ii).
16 50 U.S.C. § 1861(C)(2)(D).
YO0
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
call, and the duration of every call made in the United States.17 But it
does not intercept the content of the call nor does it know the identity
of the subscriber; it assembled all calls in the nation into a single
database because multiple telecommunications companies had
various programs to delete the records83 The NSA purges records that
are more than five years old.19 A database allows the NSA to quickly
determine the calling chain of any overseas numbers discovered to
belong to al Qaeda operatives. Once the NSA tracks down the phone
numbers called within the United States from a suspected al Qaeda
phone number, it can then seek a warrant from the FISC to place the
number under further surveillance and to collect other records, such
as financial and travel information.
II.
As business records, phone call metadata falls within Section 215's
definition of tangible items. It relates to an authorized investigation to
protect against international terrorism. Several investigations into al
Qaeda plots remain open, as shown by the repeated indictments
against bomb plotters in the last five years, and the examination of
records also helps protect the nation against terrorist attacks.
According to the NSA, only the information contained in the billing
records is collected; the content of calls are not.20 There can be no
First Amendment violation if the content of the calls remains
untouched. A critic might argue that the terms of the search are too
broad, because ninety-nine percent of the calls are unconnected to
terrorism. An intelligence search, as Judge Richard Posner has
described it, "is a search for a needle in a haystack. '"21 Rather than
focus on foreign agents who are already known, counter-terrorism
17 Steven G. Bradbury, Understanding the NSA Programs: Bulk Acquisition of Telephone
Metadata Under Section 215 and Foreign-Targeted Collection Under Section 702, 1
LAWFARE RES. PAP. SER. 1, 2 (2013).
18 Id.
19 id. at 3.
2 0 Report on the National Security Agency's Bulk Collection Programs Affected by USA
PATRIOT Act Reauthorization to Silvestre Reyes, Chairman, Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence (Dec. 14, 2oo9), at 3, available at
https://www.fas.org/irp/news/2o13/o7/2oo9 bulk.pdf.
2 1 Richard Posner, A New Surveillance Act, WALL ST. J., Feb. 15, 2006, at A16; see also
RICHARD POSNER, PREVENTING SURPRISE ATFACKS: INTELLIGENCE REFORM IN THE WAKE OF
9/11(2005).
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agencies must search for clues among millions of potentially innocent
connections, communications, and links. "The intelligence services,"
Posner writes, "must cast a wide net with a fine mesh to catch the
clues that may enable the next attack to be prevented. '"22 For this
reason, the FISC approved the NSA program in 2006 and has
continued to renew it since.23
Members of the al Qaeda network can be detected, with good
intelligence work or luck, by examining phone and e-mail
communications, as well as evidence of joint travel, shared assets,
common histories or families, meetings, and so on.2 4 As the time for
an attack nears, "chatter" on this network will increase as operatives
communicate to coordinate plans, move and position assets, and
conduct reconnaissance of targets.2 5 When our intelligence agents
successfully locate or capture an al Qaeda member, they must be able
to move quickly to follow new information to other operatives before
news of the capture causes them to disappear. The database created by
the NSA is particularly important because it will point the way to al
Qaeda agents within the United States, where they are closest to their
targets and able to inflict the most harm on civilians.
The 9/11 hijackers themselves provide an example of the way that
the NSA could correlate business record information to locate an al
Qaeda cell. Links suggested by commercially available data might
have turned up ties between every single one of the al Qaeda plotters
and Khalid al Mihdhar or Nawar al Hazmi, the two hijackers known to
the CIA in the summer of 2001 to have been in the country.26 Mihdhar
and Hazmi had rented apartments in their own name and were listed
in the San Diego phone book .27Both Mohammad Atta, the leader of
the 9/11 al Qaeda cell, and Marwan al-Shehi, who piloted one of
planes into the World Trade Center, had lived there with them.28
Hijacker Majed Moqed used the same frequent flier number as
2 2 A New Surveillance Act, supra note 21.
23 Bradbury, supra note 17.
2
4 See NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT
47, 361-98 (2004); id. at 227 n.68 (noting that the United Arab Emirates was able to track
Marwan al Shehhi, one of the future 9/11 hijackers when he contacted his family).
25 See id. at 263-65.
26 Heather MacDonald, What We Don't Know Can Hurt Us, CITYJOURNAL, Spring 2004.
271.
28 Id.
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Hazmi; five hijackers used the same phone number as Atta when
booking their flights; the remaining hijackers shared addresses or
phone numbers with one of those hijackers, Ahmed Alghamdi, who
was in the United States in violation of his visa at the time.29
Our intelligence agents, in fact, had strong leads that could
conceivably have led them to all the hijackers before 9/11.30 CIA
agents had identified Mihdhar as a likely al Qaeda operative because
he was spotted at a meeting in Kuala Lumpur and mentioned in
Middle East intercepts as part of an al Qaeda "cadre."31 Hazmi too was
known as likely to be al Qaeda.32 But in neither case was there enough
evidence for a criminal arrest, because they had not violated any
American laws. If our intelligence services had been able to
immediately track their cell phone calls and email, it is possible that
enough of the hijacking team could have been rounded up to avert
9/11.33 Our task is much more difficult today, because we might not
have even this slender information in hand when the next al Qaeda
plot moves toward execution.
As the United States fought the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, and
continues to pursue al Qaeda groups in the Middle East and Africa, it
captured al Qaeda laptops, cell phones, financial documents, and the
other signs of modern high-tech life. This gave intelligence officers
information on dozens or hundreds of e-mail addresses, telephones,
bank and credit account numbers, and residential and office addresses
used by their network.34 To exploit this, U.S. intelligence services must
follow those leads as fast as possible, before the network of al Qaeda
operatives can migrate to a new leader. An e-mail lead can disappear
as fast as it takes someone to open a new e-mail account.
FISA, and the law enforcement mentality it embodies, creates
several problems. FISA requires "probable cause" to believe that
someone is an agent of a foreign power before one can get a warrant to
collect phone calls and e-mails.35 An al Qaeda leader could have a cell
2 9Id.
30 id.
31 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 25, at 158, 181.
32 See id. at 158-59, 181-82.
33 Id. at 272.
34 See, e.g., id. at 382 (explaining how the United States can help thwart potential terrorist
attacks by targeting and gathering terrorist organizations' financial information).
35 50 U.S.C. § 18O5(a)(2).
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phone with 100 numbers in its memory, ten of which are in the United
States and thus require a warrant. Would a FISA judge have found
probable cause to think the users of those ten numbers are al Qaeda
too? Probably not. Would our intelligence agencies even immediately
know who was using those numbers at the time of captured al Qaeda
leader's calls? The same is true of his e-mail, as to which it will not be
immediately obvious what addresses are held by U.S. residents.
In our world of rapidly shifting e-mail addresses, multiple cell
phone numbers, and Internet communications, FISA imposes slow
and cumbersome procedures on our intelligence and law enforcement
officers.36 These laborious checks are based on the assumption that we
remain within the criminal justice system, and look backwards at
crimes in order to conduct prosecutions, rather than within the
national security system, which looks forward in order to prevent
attacks on the American people.37 FISA requires a lengthy review
process, in which special FBI and DOJ lawyers prepare an extensive
package of facts and law to present to the FISC.38 The Attorney
General must personally sign the application, and another high-
ranking national security officer, such as the President's National
Security Advisor or the Director of the FBI, must certify that the
information sought is for foreign intelligence.39 Creating an existing
database of numbers that can be quickly searched can allow the
government to take advantage of captured al Qaeda numbers abroad,
before the cells within the United States break their contacts.
A critic, however, might argue that billions of innocent calling
records are not "relevant" to a terrorism investigation. Even if terrorist
communications take place over the phone, that cannot justify the
collection of all phone call records in the United States, the vast
36 See Americo R. Cinquegrana, The Walls (and Wires) Have Ears: The Background and
First Ten Years of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 793,
825 (1989), reasoning in 1989 that: "FISA also must keep pace with the continuing
explosion in communications technologies available both to law enforcement agencies and
potential surveillance targets. FISA was drafted to take account of experience and
technology developed between 1968 and 1978, but the decade since its passage has
witnessed substantial technological changes that could require amendments to FISA in
order to extend its privacy protections and to facilitate legitimate government interests that
might otherwise be frustrated."
37 See JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS 71-74, 79-80 (2006) (noting that an artificial
"Wall" in place for decades between information gathered for intelligence and information
gathered for law enforcement purposes hindered the government's ability to piece together
intelligence which could have stopped the 9/11 attacks).
38 See 50 U.S.C. § 1804 (2000) (current version at 50 U.S.C.A. § 1804 (West 2006)).
3950 U.S.C. § 18o4(a).
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majority of which have nothing to do with the grounds for the search.
The FISC rejected this argument because, to be useful, a database has
to be broad enough to find terrorist calls. "Because known and
unknown international terrorist operatives are using telephone
communications, and because it is necessary to obtain the bulk
collection of a telephone company's metadata to determine those
connections between known and unknown international terrorist
operatives as part of authorized investigations," the court observed,
"the production of the information sought meets the standard for
relevance under Section 215."40 Aggregating calling records into a
database, the court found, was necessary to find the terrorist
communications and the links between terrorists.41 It may not even be
possible to detect the links before such a database is created. If a
database is not comprehensive, in other words, then the government
will only be able to glimpse incomplete patterns of terrorist activity, if
it can glimpse any at all.
Relevance is a slippery concept, but it cannot require that every
piece of information obtained by subpoena must contain information
related to guilt. Even when grand juries subpoena the business
records or communications of a criminal suspect, it is likely that the
large majority of the items will not have any relationship to the crime.
Nonetheless, a grand jury may subpoena all of a suspect's financial
records to find those that pertain to a criminal conspiracy. A different
way to view the NSA's telephone calling record program is that the
"relevant" tangible "thing" is the database itself, rather than any
individual calling record.
Of course, the NSA program differs from a subpoena to a financial
institution for the records of a known criminal suspect. The amount of
data collected by the NSA program are many orders of magnitude
greater, and hence the percentage of directly involved
communications much smaller. Also, unlike a regular subpoena, it is
important to have as large a searchable database as possible, because
the breadth will bring into the sharpest contrast the possible patterns
of terrorist activity. On the other hand, the magnitude of harm that
the government seeks to prevent exceeds by several orders that of
regular crime and involves a foreign enemy, rather than persistent
crime. The magnitude of the harm should be taken into account in
judging relevance as well as the unprecedented difficulties of locating
al Qaeda operatives disguised within the United States.
40 In Re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the
Production of Tangible Things From, BR 13-1o9, at 18 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013), available
at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fise/br13-09-primary-order.pdf.
41id.
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The NSA's second surveillance program, which targets Internet
communications involving foreigners, poses different legal challenges.
But a careful review shows that it does not violate statutory or
constitutional law, although the program's facts remain somewhat
unclear. According to reports, in addition to the collection of
telephone call metadata, the NSA also intercepts electronic
communications-presumably e-mails-by foreigners outside the
United States.42 Apparently, this program also depends on the
collection and storage of vast amounts of data, gained either by
request from Internet service providers (ISPs) or from the Internet
backbone networks themselves.43 According to its own public
description of the program in August 2013, the NSA generates
"identifiers" of non-U.S. persons outside the country whom it is
believed "possess, communicate, or are likely to receive foreign
intelligence information authorized for collection under an approved
certification."44 The government uses these "identifiers," which take
the form of e-mail addresses and phone numbers, to acquire selected
communications.45
The NSA's program falls precisely within FISA as currently
written. Congress specifically amended the statute, at first temporarily
in 2007 and then permanently in 2008, to authorize this exact
program.4 6 It most recently renewed this authority, codified in Section
702 of FISA, in 2012.47 Section 702 allows the government to target
for surveillance a non-U.S. person reasonably believed to be outside
the United States for up to one year. Congress specifically limited the
reach of the statute in four ways. Surveillance may not:
1. Intentionally target anyone known to be inside the
United States;
2. Seek to reverse target a person believed to be in the
United States through their contacts with individuals
outside the U.S.;
42 National Security Agency, supra note 1.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 See Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat. 552; FISA Amendments
Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436.
47 FISAAmendments Act of 2012 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(a)).
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3. Intentionally target any U.S. person; and
4. Intentionally collect any communication where the
sender and all receivers are known to be in the United
States.48
These exceptions describe a specific category of communications that
the government may collect: The communications of non-U.S. persons
believed to be outside the United States. It does not allow the
surveillance of wholly domestic communications or those by U.S.
persons anywhere in the world. Notice the important lacuna: The
statute does not specify where the communications take place, only
the locations of the persons engaged in communicating.
Congress's authorization of collection based only on the location of
the sender and receiver is important because of the nature of Internet
communications. When a person sends an e-mail, the Internet breaks
the message up into packets, sends them through the most efficient
network routes possible, and then reassembles them into the message
at a point of reception. Depending on network efficiencies, the
electronic communications of two people-even if they are in adjacent
towns-might transverse any country where network backbones are
located, such as the United States. Section 702 simply recognizes that
a different set of surveillance authorities should not be triggered
simply because part of a message between non-U.S. persons passes
through the United States. For example, if a suspected terrorist in
Pakistan were to send an email to an address of a person believed to
be located in Afghanistan, the NSA could intercept the e-mail even if
part or all of the message itself moved through communication
networks located in the United States.
With Internet communications, however, the government may not
easily know the physical location or citizenship of the senders or
receivers. An email addresses, such as yoo@law.berkeley.edu, does
not obviously contain geographical location data. Berkeley might refer
to a city in California, Australia, Canada, or the United Kingdom, or to
the University of California at Berkeley. ISP-based emails, such as
Gmail, Yahoo, or Hotmail, provide even less hint of a location. The
government could look at metadata contained within the email
messages themselves, or perhaps at the MAC addresses, which are
unique to each computer, to attempt to determine location. But
because of this lack of precision, it is inevitable that some
unauthorized communications will be collected. As a result, Section
702 requires the FISC to approve the procedures used to develop
48 50 U.S.C. § 1881(a)(b).
[VOL. 10:2
2014]
targets and to minimize the collection of any communications by U.S.
persons.4 9 If the government seeks to intentionally collect the emails
of U.S. persons or non-U.S. persons located in the United States, it
must still obtain a FISC court order.5O
The second NSA surveillance program fits cleanly within statutory
authorization because Congress amended FISA precisely to fit the
program. To be sure, there have been disagreements between the FISC
and the NSA over the exact implementation of the program in a
manner consistent with Section 702. Examination of the FISC
opinions made public, however, indicate that these contests involve
minimization procedures where the NSA has intercepted a relatively
small number of domestic communications or emails by U.S. persons.
In October 2011, for example, the FISC criticized an NSA technique of
collecting emails from "upstream" sources-i.e., from the internet
backbone itself rather than from ISPs-because it swept in several
thousand domestic e-mails out of tens of millions of foreign emails.51
The FISC's opinion did not terminate the program, but instead led the
NSA to modify its minimization procedures in order to avoid
collection of the domestic e-mails.52 One month later, the FISC
approved the new minimization procedures and the collection
program continued.53 These declassified FISC opinions make clear
that judicial resistance to the NSA's program comes not from the legal
authority for the electronic surveillance, but from second order
concerns over implementation. Concerns about the legality over the
program cannot arise over FISA or other statutes, but over the
Constitution.
III.
Even if Congress and the President have sufficient power under
statutory law to carry out the NSA programs, they may still violate the
Constitution. A government decision may satisfy the structural
49 50 U.S.C. § 188i(a)(g).
50 50 U.S.C. § 1804.
51 FISA Court Memorandum Opinion and Order of Oct. 3, 2011, available at
http://www.odni.gov/files/documents/October%202011%2oBates%200pinion%2oand%2
oOrder%2oPart%201.pdf.
52 Id.
53 FISA Court Memorandum Opinion and Order of Nov. 30, 2011, at 2, available at
http://www.odni.gov/files/documents/November%202011%2oBates%200pinion%2oand
%200rder%2oPart%201.pdf.
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provisions of the Constitution-such as the separation of powers and
federalism-yet still run afoul of the Bill of Rights. This Part measures
the two NSA programs against the primary individual right at stake,
the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures. It concludes that both the telephone metadata and
foreign e-mail collection programs, as currently described by the
Obama administration, do not violate the Fourth Amendment.
The NSA's first program, which collects metadata of domestic
phone calls, poses the fewest constitutional difficulties. Under existing
judicial doctrine, individuals have Fourth Amendment rights in the
content of communications, but not in their addressing information.54
However, privacy does not extend to the writing on the outside of
envelopes deposited in the mail because the sender has voluntarily
revealed the addresses to the post office for delivery.55 An identical
principle applies to telecommunications. In Smith v. Maryland, the
Supreme Court found calling information, such as the phone number
dialed, beyond Fourth Amendment protection because the consumer
had voluntarily turned over the information to a third party-namely,
the phone company for connection and billing purposes.56 In the
rubric of Katz v. United States, no one can have an expectation of
privacy in records that they have handed over to someone else.57
In recent cases, however, the Court has turned a skeptical eye
toward new search technologies. In Kyllo v. United States, for
example, the Court held that thermal imaging of homes qualified as a
search under the Fourth Amendment, even though the police used the
device from a public street.51 In United States v. Jones, the Court
found that the Fourth Amendment required a warrant for the
placement of a global positioning system tracker on a car.59 These
cases depend on the means by which the government conducts a
search in a place protected by the Fourth Amendment. In Kyllo, the
54 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744-45 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435,
443 (1976).
55 See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (holding that "[w]hat a person
knowingly exposes to the public.., is not a subject of Fourth Amendment Protection").
56 Id.
57 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351; see also Smith v. Maryland, 422 U.S. at 743-44 ("a person has
no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third
parties").
58 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001).
59 132 S.Ct. 945, 947-49 (2012).
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Court believed that thermal imaging verged on a physical search of a
home, while Jones involved physical intrusion into a private car.
Neither holding calls into doubt the waiver of Fourth Amendment
rights when an individual voluntarily hands over information to a
third party. Under these cases, the NSA may still follow the Fourth
Amendment warrant process to access information inside the home or
personal computing devices. But the data loses its Fourth Amendment
status when an individual reveals it to another. As a result, the
Constitution does not require a warrant for a pen register because no
electronic interception or surveillance of the content of the calls has
occurred.
Meanwhile, the data collected is potentially of enormous use in
frustrating al Qaeda plots. If U.S. agents are pointed to members of an
al Qaeda sleeper cell by a domestic phone number found in a captured
al Qaeda leader's cell phone, call pattern analysis would allow the NSA
to quickly determine the extent of the network and its activities. The
NSA, for example, could track the sleeper cell as it periodically
changed phone numbers. This could give a quick, initial database-
generated glimpse of the possible size and activity level of the cell in
an environment where time is of the essence. A critic might respond
that there is a difference between a pen register that captures the
phone numbers called by a single person and a database that captures
all of the phone numbers called by everyone in the United States. The
Supreme Court, however, has never held that obtaining billing records
would somehow violate privacy merely because of the large number of
such records.
A different Fourth Amendment issue applies to the second NSA
program, which intercepts emails between foreigners abroad. As the
Supreme Court has observed, the Fourth Amendment does not
provide rights outside the United States except to citizens or those
with sufficient connections to the nation, such as permanent resident
aliens. In United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, the Court held that a
non-U.S. person could not claim any constitutional rights to bar his
capture outside the United States.60 A critic might respond that the
Bill of Rights limits the powers of the government regardless of the
citizenship of the individual involved. Tellingly, the Court rejected this
argument because it would render impossible the conduct of war
against foreign enemies. 61 If all foreigners held Fourth Amendment
rights, the Court reasoned, the United States would be unable to use
force against them in wartime without a warrant or a determination of
60 494 U.S. 259, 273 (1990).
61Id. at 273-74.
YO0
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
constitutional reasonableness after the fact.62 Such a rule, the Court
reasoned, had never prevailed in American history.63 So long as the
second NSA program collects foreign emails between non-U.S.
persons, the Fourth Amendment is not implicated.64
There is one critical fact about the e-mail intercept program,
however, that might trigger the Fourth Amendment. Passage of e-mail
packets through switches or network backbones located within the
territorial United States might create enough of a nexus with the
United States to garner constitutional protections. A court might
analogize the legal status of e-mails to an air flight that takes off from
Canada and lands in Mexico-while the plane flies over the United
States, it falls subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
There are several reasons, however, that this analogy fails. First,
packets are not the message themselves, but are pieces of them that
are broken apart and reassembled. The message itself is not in a
completed form except when it is first written or when it is later
reassembled. At those points in time, when the message is actually a
unified whole, it is located outside the United States.
Second, because the presence of much of the Internet backbone is
in the United States, finding that any packet that transverses the
United States triggers the Bill of Rights would effectively extend
constitutional status to all email communications in the world due to
central importance of the United States to the operation of the
Internet. If everyone in the world has a constitutional right, then the
Constitution has lost its meaning as a framework of government for a
single community: "We the People" of the United States.65 This is a
result that the Court in Verdugo-Urquidez expressly sought to avoid.
Third, non-U.S. persons communicating outside the United States
could not possibly have an expectation of privacy under the Fourth
Amendment. To be sure, they might think their messages are private
because of the difficulty of intercepting internet communications. But
they could not think they had any expectation of privacy cognizable
under the U.S. Constitution when they were not located within the
United States and had no other connections to the nation. Non-U.S.
62Id.
63Id. at 274-275.
64 Id. at 275.
65 For a broader explanation of the relationship of the Constitution's guiding principle of
popular sovereignty with national security and foreign affairs see JULIAN Ku & JOHN YOO,
TAMING GLOBALIZATION: INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, AND THE NEW
WORLD ORDER (2012).
[VOL. 10:2
2014]
persons outside the territorial U.S. do not have enough connections
with the United States to benefit from its laws and constitutional
protections.
Even if constitutional privacy interests were thought to extend to
telephone metadata or foreign emails, the Fourth Amendment's
warrant requirement would still not apply because the NSA searches
seek to prevent military attacks, not garden-variety criminal activity.66
As observed earlier, every lower court to examine the question has
found that when the government conducts a search of a foreign power
or its agents, it need not meet the requirements that apply to criminal
law enforcement. Though admittedly, the Supreme Court has never
held on the question, it has suggested in dicta that roadblocks and
dragnets to stop a terrorist bombing in an American city would not
need to meet the warrant requirement's demand for individualized
suspicion. 67
This approach is fully consistent with the Supreme Court's recent
Fourth Amendment cases. Not all searches require a warrant. Rather,
as the Court found in a 1995 case upholding random drug testing of
high school athletes, "[a]s the text of the Fourth Amendment
indicates, the ultimate measure of the constitutionality of a
governmental search is 'reasonableness."' 68 When a passenger enters
an airport, government employees search his belongings and subject
him to an X-ray-undoubtedly a search-without a warrant. When
travelers enter the country, customs and immigration officials can
search their baggage and sometimes their person without a warrant. 69
Of course, when law enforcement undertakes a search to discover
evidence of criminal wrongdoing, reasonableness generally requires a
judicial warrant. But when the government's conduct is not focused on
law enforcement, a warrant is unnecessary. A warrantless search can
be constitutional, the Court has said, "when special needs, beyond the
66 This conclusion is supported by the Supreme Court's recent "special needs" cases, which
allow reasonable, warrantless searches for government needs that go beyond regular law
enforcement. See Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653, 115
S.Ct. 2386, 2391, 132 L.Ed.2d 564 (1995) (random drug-testing of student athletes);
Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (199o) (stopping drunk
drivers); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (border control
checkpoints).
67 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000).
68 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 652.
69 See, e.g., United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985).
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normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-
cause requirement impracticable."7o
A search must be "reasonable" under the circumstances. What
does "reasonable" mean? The Court has upheld warrantless searches
to reduce deaths on the nation's highways, maintain safety among
railway workers, and ensure that government officials were not using
drugs.71 In these cases, the "importance of the governmental interests"
outweighed the "nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's
Fourth Amendment interests."72 It is hard to imagine that any of these
situations are more important than protecting the nation from a direct
foreign attack in wartime. "It is 'obvious and unarguable,"' the
Supreme Court has observed several times, "that no governmental
interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation."73 It is the
duty of the President to respond to attacks on the territory and people
of the United States. Congress confirmed the President's authority to
use force after 9/11. The extraordinary circumstances of war require
that the government seek specific information relevant to possible
attacks on Americans, sometimes in situations where a warrant is not
practical.74
Before the 9/11 attacks, the Supreme Court observed that the
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement would probably not apply
to the special circumstances created by a potential terrorist attack.
"[T]he Fourth Amendment would almost certainly permit an
appropriately tailored roadblock set up to thwart an imminent
terrorist attack or to catch a dangerous criminal who is likely to flee by
70 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 653 (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)).
71 See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938 (1996) (per curiam) (automobile
searches); Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 646 (drug testing of athletes); Michigan v. Dept. of State
Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 444 (drunk driver checkpoints); Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives' Ass'n., 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (drug testing railroad personnel); Treasury
Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (drug testing federal customs officers);
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (baggage search); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968) (temporary stop and search).
72 See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985).
73 Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981).
74 The courts have observed that even the use of deadly force is reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment if used in self-defense or to protect others. Here, the right to self-
defense is not that of an individual, but that of the nation and of its citizens. Cf. In re
Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (189o); The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862). If the
government's heightened interest in self-defense justifies the use of deadly force, then it
certainly would also justify warrantless searches.
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way of a particular route."75 To be sure, this 2000 case challenged the
constitutionality of a highway checkpoint program that searched cars
for illegal drugs, not a search for terrorists. And in this case the Court
found that the checkpoints violated the Fourth Amendment protection
against search and seizure because the police were searching for drugs
for the purpose of "crime control" and "the ordinary enterprise of
investigating crimes."76 But the Court was still observing that some
warrantless searches were acceptable in the emergency situation of a
possible terrorist attack, in which the "need for such measures to
ensure public safety can be particularly acute."77
If national security searches do not require a warrant, it might be
asked why FISA is even necessary. FISA offers the executive branch a
deal. If a President complies with the process of obtaining a FISA
warrant, courts will likely agree that the search was reasonable and
will admit its fruits as evidence in a criminal case. FISA does not
create the power to authorize national security searches. Rather, it
describes a safe harbor that deems searches obtained with a warrant
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. If a President proceeds
with a search under his own authority rather than under FISA or
under ordinary criminal procedure, he takes his chances. A court
might refuse to admit evidence in any future proceeding that had been
obtained without a warrant, or even allow the target to sue the
government for damages.78 Then again, it might not.
FISA ultimately cannot limit the President's powers to protect
national security through surveillance if those powers stem from his
unique Article II responsibilities. Intercepting enemy communications
has long been part of waging war; indeed, it is critical to the successful
use of force.79 The United States military cannot attack or defend to
75 City of Indianapolis, 531 U.S. at 44.
76 Id. at 47.
77 Id. at 47-48.
78 Cf. Akhil Amar, The Constitution and Criminal Procedure: First Principles 1-45 (1998).
79 In the 1907 Hague Regulations, one of the first treaties on the laws of war, the leading
military powers agreed "the employment of measures necessary for obtaining information
about the enemy and the country is considered permissible." Interception of electronic
communications is known as SIGINT, or signals intelligence, as opposed to HUMINT, or
human intelligence. Writers on the laws of war have recognized that interception of an
enemy's communications is a legitimate tool of war. According to one recognized authority,
nations at war can gather intelligence using air and ground reconnaissance and
observation, "interception of enemy messages, wireless and other," capturing documents,
and interrogating prisoners. MORRIS GREENSPAN, THE MODERN LAW OF LAND WARFARE
326(1959).
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good effect unless it knows where to aim. America has a long history
of conducting intelligence surveillance during wartime. General
Washington used spies extensively during the Revolutionary War, and
as President, established a secret fund for spying that existed until the
creation of the CIA.A° President Lincoln personally hired spies during
the Civil War, a practice the Supreme Court uphelds1 In both World
War I and II, Presidents ordered the interception of electronic
communications leaving the United States.8 2 Some of America's
greatest wartime intelligence successes have involved SIGINT, most
notably the breaking of Japanese diplomatic and naval codes during
World War II, which allowed the U.S. Navy to anticipate the attack on
Midway Island.8 3 SIGINT is even more important in this war than in
those of the last century. Al Qaeda has launched a variety of efforts to
attack the United States, and it intends to continue them. The primary
way to stop those attacks is to find and stop al Qaeda operatives who
have infiltrated the United States. The best way to find them is to
intercept their electronic communications entering or leaving the
country.
The need for executive authority over electronic intelligence
gathering becomes apparent when we consider the facts of the war
against al Qaeda. In the hours and days after 9/11, members of the
government thought that al Qaeda would try to crash other airliners or
use a weapon of mass destruction in a major East Coast city, probably
Washington, D.C. In response, combat air patrols began flying above
New York and Washington. Suppose a plane was hijacked and would
not respond to air traffic controllers. It would be reasonable for U.S.
anti-terrorism personnel to intercept any radio or cell phone calls to
or from the airliner, in order to discover the hijackers' intentions,
what was happening on the plane, and ultimately whether it would be
necessary for the fighters to shoot down the plane. Under the civil
libertarian approach to privacy, the government could not monitor the
suspected hijackers' phone or radio calls unless they received a
judicial warrant first-the calls, after all, are electronic
communications within the United States. A warrant would be hard to
80 Halperin v. Cent. Intelligence Agency, 629 F.2d 144, 158 (D.C. Cir. 198o).
81 Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1876).
82 During World Wars I and II, two executive orders were issued to authorize the United
States Government to censor certain electronic communications to protect information
from reaching enemy combatants. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 2604 (Apr. 28, 1917) (World
War I order); Exec. Order No. 8985 (Dec. 19, 1941) (World War II order).
83 CHRISTOPHERANDREW, FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY 124-25 (1995).
[V01. 10:2320
2014]
get because it is unlikely that the government would then know the
identities of all the hijackers, who might be U.S. citizens or permanent
resident aliens. But because the U.S. is in a state of war, the military
can intercept the communications of the plane to see if it poses a
threat, and target the enemy if necessary-without a judicial warrant,
because the purpose is not arrest and trial, but to prevent an attack.
This comports far better with the principle of reasonableness that
guides the Fourth Amendment.
As Commander-in-Chief, the President has the constitutional
power and the responsibility to wage war in response to a direct attack
against the United States. In the Civil War, President Lincoln
undertook several actions-raised an army, withdrew money from the
treasury, launched a blockade-on his own authority in response to
the Confederate attack on Fort Sumter. Congress and the Supreme
Court later approved Lincoln's moves.8 4 During World War II, the
Supreme Court similarly recognized that once war began, the
President's authority as Commander-in-Chief and Chief Executive
gave him the tools necessary to effectively wage war. 5 In the wake of
the 9/11 attacks, Congress agreed that "the President has authority
under the Constitution to take action to deter and prevent acts of
international terrorism against the United States," which recognizes
the President's authority to use force to respond to al Qaeda, and any
powers necessary and proper to that end.86
Even legal scholars who argue against this historical practice
concede that once the United States has been attacked, the President
can respond immediately with force. The ability to collect intelligence
is intrinsic to the use of military force. It is inconceivable that the
Constitution would vest in the President the powers of Commander-
in-Chief and Chief Executive, give him the responsibility to protect the
nation from attack, but then disable him from gathering intelligence
to use the military most effectively to defeat the enemy. All evidence of
the Framers' understanding of the Constitution supports the notion
that the government would have every ability to meet a foreign
danger. As James Madison wrote in The Federalist, "security against
84 The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 670. For a more detailed discussion, see JOHN YOO, CRISIS
AND COMMAND: EXECUTWE POWER FROM GEORGE WASHINGTON TO GEORGE W. BUSH 199-
257(2010).
85 The President has the power "to direct the performance of those functions which may
constitutionally be performed by the military arm of the nation in time of war," and to
issue military commands using the powers to conduct war "to repel and defeat the enemy."
Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942).
86 Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. 107-40 (Sept. 18, 2001).
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foreign danger is one of the primitive objects of civil society."8 7
Therefore, the "powers requisite for attaining it must be effectually
confided to the federal councils."88 After World War II, the Supreme
Court declared, "this grant of war power includes all that is necessary
and proper for carrying these powers into execution."8 9 Covert
operations and electronic surveillance are clearly part of this
authority.
During the writing of the Constitution, some Framers believed that
the President alone should manage intelligence because only he could
keep secrets. 90 Several Supreme Court cases have recognized that the
President's role as Commander-in-Chief and the sole organ of the
nation in its foreign relations must include the power to collect
intelligence.91 These authorities agree that intelligence rests with the
President because its structure allows it to act with unity, secrecy, and
speed.
Presidents have long ordered electronic surveillance without any
judicial or congressional participation. More than a year before the
Pearl Harbor attacks, but with war clearly looming with the Axis
powers, President Franklin Roosevelt authorized the FBI to intercept
any communications, whether wholly inside the country or
international, of persons "suspected of subversive activities against
the Government of the United States, including suspected spies."92
FDR was concerned that "fifth columns" could wreak havoc with the
war effort. "It is too late to do anything about it after sabotage,
assassinations and 'fifth column' activities are completed," FDR wrote
in his order3 FDR ordered the surveillance even though a federal law
8 7 THE FEDERALIST NO. 41, at 269 (James Madison)(Jacob E. Cooke ed. 1961).
88 Id.
89 Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 788 (1950).
90 THE FEDERALIST NO. 64, at 435 (John Jay)(Jacob E. Cooke ed. 1961).
91 See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936); Chicago &
S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103,111 (1948). In a post-Civil War case,
recently re-affirmed, the Court ruled that President Lincoln had the constitutional
authority to engage in espionage. The President "was undoubtedly authorized during the
war, as commander-in-chief.., to employ secret agents to enter the rebel lines and obtain
information respecting the strength, resources, and movements of the enemy." Totten v.
United States, 92 U.S. 105, io6 (1876). On Totten's continuing vitality, see Tenet v. Doe,
544 U.S. 1, 8-11 (2005).
92 Reprinted in Appendix A, United States v. United States District Court, 444 F.2d 651,
669-70 (6th Cir. 1971).
93 Id. at 670.
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at the time prohibited electronic surveillance without a warrant.94
Presidents continued to monitor the communications of national
security threats on their own authority, even in peacetime.95 If
Presidents in times of peace could order surveillance of spies and
terrorists, executive authority is only the greater now, as hostilities
continue against al Qaeda. This is a view that Justice Departments
have not just held under Presidents George W. Bush or Barack
Obama. The Clinton Justice Department held a similar view of the
executive branch's authority to conduct surveillance outside the FISA
framework.96
Courts have never opposed a President's authority to engage in
warrantless electronic surveillance to protect national security. When
the Supreme Court first considered this question in 1972, it held that
the Fourth Amendment required a judicial warrant if a President
wanted to conduct surveillance of a purely domestic group, but it
refused to address surveillance of foreign threats to national
security.97 In the years since, every federal appeals court, including the
FISA Appeals Court, to address the question has "held that the
President did have inherent authority to conduct warrantless searches
to obtain foreign intelligence information. "9 The FISA Appeals Court
did not even feel that it was worth much discussion. It took the
President's power to do so "for granted," and observed that, "FISA
could not encroach on the President's constitutional power."99
94 See Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937) (interpreting Section 605 of Federal
Communications Act of 1934 to prohibit interception of telephone calls).
95 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978: Hearings on H.R. 5764, H.R. 9745, H.R.
7308, and H.R. 5632 Before the Subcomm. on Legislation of the House Comm. on
Intelligence, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1978) (Statement of Attorney General Griffin Bell).
96 Most notably, Clinton Deputy Attorney General Jamie Gorelick testified before Congress
that the Justice Department could carry out physical searches for foreign intelligence
purposes, even though FISA at the time did not provide for them. Amending the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act: Hearings Before the House Permanent Select Comm. on
Intelligence, 103d Cong. 2d Sess. 61 (1994). Clinton's OLC even issued a legal opinion that
the President could order the sharing of electronic surveillance gathered through criminal
wiretaps between the Justice Department and intelligence agencies, even though this was
prohibited by statute. Sharing Title III Elec. Surveillance Material with the Intelligence
Cmty, 2000 WL 33716983 (U.S.A.G. Oct. 17, 2000).
97 United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
98 In re Sealed Case, 31o F.3d 717, 742 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).
99 Id.
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Congress also implicitly authorized the President to carry out
electronic surveillance to prevent further attacks on the United States.
Congress's September 18, 2001 Authorization to Use Military Force
(AUMF) is sweeping; it has no limitation on time or place-only that
the President pursue al Qaeda.100 Although the President did not need,
as a constitutional matter, Congress's permission to pursue and attack
al Qaeda after the attacks on New York City and the Pentagon, its
passage shows that the President and Congress fully agreed that
military action would be appropriate. Congress's approval of the
killing and capture of al Qaeda members must have obviously
included the tools to locate them in the first place.
A choice between FISA or his constitutional authority gives the
President the discretion to use the best method to protect the United
States, whether through the military or by relying on law enforcement.
It also means warrantless surveillance will not be introduced into the
criminal justice system; the judiciary is only needed to enforce this
legal distinction. Presidents could alleviate concern about the NSA
programs by publicly declaring that no evidence generated by them
will be used in a criminal case. Although FISA cannot supersede the
President's constitutional authority, it can provide a more stable
system for the domestic collection of foreign intelligence, such as the
NSA's collection of phone call metadata and foreign e-mails.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The real problem with FISA, and even the Patriot Act, as they
existed before the 2oo8 Amendments, is that they remained rooted in
a law enforcement approach to electronic surveillance. They tied the
government's counter-terrorism efforts to individualized suspicion.
Searches and wiretaps had to target a specific individual already
believed to be involved in harmful activity. But detecting al Qaeda
members who have no previous criminal record in the United States,
and who are undeterred by the possibility of criminal sanctions,
requires the use of more sweeping methods.
To successfully prevent attacks, the government has to devote
surveillance resources where there is a reasonable chance that
terrorists will appear, or communicate, even if their specific identities
remain unknown. What if the government knew that there was a fifty
percent chance that terrorists would use a certain communications
pipeline, such as e-mails provided by a popular Pakistani ISP, but that
most of the communications on that channel would not be linked to
terrorism? An approach based on individualized suspicion would
100 Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (Sept. 18, 2001).
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prevent computers from searching through that channel for the
keywords or names that might suggest terrorist communications,
because there are no specific al Qaeda suspects, and thus no probable
cause. Rather than individualized suspicion, searching for terrorists
depends on playing the probabilities, just as roadblocks or airport
screenings do. The private owner of any website has detailed access to
information about the individuals who visit the site that he can exploit
for his own commercial purposes, such as selling lists of names to
spammers, or gathering market data on individuals or groups. Is the
government's effort to find violent terrorists a less legitimate use of
such data?
Individualized suspicion dictates the focus of law enforcement, but
war demands that our armed forces defend the country with a broader
perspective. Armies do not meet a "probable cause" requirement when
they attack a position or fire on enemy troops or intercept enemy
communications on a frequency. The criminal justice system's
purpose is to hold a specific person responsible for a discrete crime
that has already happened. A probable cause requirement does not
make sense when the purpose of intelligence is to take action, such as
killing or capturing members of the enemy, to prevent future harm to
the nation from a foreign threat.
FISA should be regarded as a safe harbor that allows the fruits of
an authorized search to be used for prosecution. Using FISA sacrifices
speed and breadth of information in favor of individualized suspicion,
but it provides a path for using evidence in a civilian criminal
prosecution. If the President chooses to rely on his constitutional
authority alone to conduct warrantless searches, then he should
generally only use the information for military purposes. The primary
objective of the NSA programs is to "detect and prevent" possible al
Qaeda attacks on the United States, whether another attack like
September 11; a bomb in apartment buildings, bridges, or
transportation hubs such as airports; or a nuclear, biological, or
chemical attack. These are not hypotheticals; they are all al Qaeda
plots, some of which U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies
have already stopped. A President will want to use information
gathered by the NSA to deploy military, intelligence, and law
enforcement personnel to stop the next attack. The price to pay for
speed, however, is foregoing any future criminal prosecution. If the
President wants to use the NSA to engage in warrantless searches, he
cannot use its fruits in an ordinary criminal prosecution.
Al Qaeda has launched a variety of efforts to attack the United
States, and it intends to continue them. The primary way to stop those
attacks is to find and stop al Qaeda operatives, and the best way to
find them is to intercept their electronic communications. Properly
understood, the Constitution does not subject the government to
YO0
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unreasonable burdens in carrying out its highest duty of protecting
the nation from attack.
